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Introduction 
The last two decades have seen a growing interest in emerging country multinational 
enterprises (EMNEs) which have come to wield a growing influence on the competitive 
dynamics of a variety of sectors. The EMNE itself is not new: the subject was the focus of a 
number of studies in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Lecraw, 1981; Lall, 1983; Tolentino, 1993; 
Dunning et al, 1998). However, the surge in outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
activity from developing economies since the early 1990s has again brought the subject to the 
forefront of international business research (e.g. UNCTAD, 2006; Van Agtmael 2007; 
Ramamurti and Singh 2009; Gammeltoft et al, 2010; Meyer and Thaijongrak, 2013). Some 
have gone so far to suggest that the rise of the EMNEs will help define a new global 
economic order (e.g. OECD, 2010). We take a sceptical view of such irrational exuberance, 
asking more modestly: is this growth of OFDI from developing countries really sustainable, 
given the L assets of their underlying home economies? 
Whether the EMNE represents a new form of MNE with a fundamentally different modus 
operandi has promoted a rich debate
1
. This discussion has hinged upon whether EMNEs have 
the necessary ownership advantages (or O assets
2
) to compete with MNEs from developed 
                                                          
1
 For an excellent summary, see contributions to the special issue of Global Strategy Journal (2012) edited by 
Cuervo-Cazurra, particularly Cuervo Cazurra (2012) Hennart (2012), Narula (2012).  See also contributions to 
Ramamurti and Cuervo-Cazurra (eds) 2014.  
2
 There is some discussion in the literature as to whether the term ‘assets’ is more accurate than ‘advantages’ 
(Narula and Santangelo, 2012). In this paper we use the terms interchangeably.   
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countries, and indeed, whether -in a globalised world - EMNEs require such O assets in the 
first place.  Some have argued that EMNEs can utilise investments abroad as a mechanism to 
acquire these assets through M&A, as well as through strategic alliances, arguing that 
internationalisation by EMNEs does not require O assets as a precondition (Mathews, 2006). 
Narula (2012) and Hennart (2012) have insisted that in order to augment assets through 
internationalisation, EMNEs must already have a threshold level of capabilities, while 
Ramamurti (2012) and Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) pursues the middle road, suggesting that 
EMNEs can do both, simultaneously building up assets while acquiring assets abroad. 
Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that some EMNEs have invested heavily in 
upgrading their capabilities through R&D as well as through OFDI and strategic partnerships 
(e.g. Figueiredo, 2003, 2011; Awate, et al, 2012).  
Much of the debate on the ownership advantages of EMNEs has revolved around how 
EMNEs utilize internationalization to access location-specific assets of host countries, and by 
so doing, access the capabilities associated with firms collocated in these countries. 
Relatively little has been said on how the home country contributes to the ownership 
advantages of EMNEs. The home country plays a central role in creating and sustaining 
competitive domestic firms, and by extension, its MNEs. We pursue this line of enquiry here, 
by examining the underlying location-specific endowments of the home country in ensuring 
the competitiveness of its firms.  
That the competitiveness of firms from a given economy derives from the competitiveness of 
their home economy should be relatively uncontroversial (Cantwell, 1989; Lall, 1992; 
Narula, 1996, 2012). That is, the O assets of firms are a function of the economic, social, and 
political milieu of the location where their strategic activities are based (normally their home 
country), which are the location-specific (L) assets.  It is well known that the home country L 
assets define and constrain the kind of ownership-specific (O) assets an MNE possesses. This 
is particularly crucial for ‘new’ and ‘adolescent’ MNEs whose initial O assets have an 
especially strong influence of their country of origin (Narula, 2012).  Home country L assets 
can be both a ‘push’ and a ‘pull’ factor: weaknesses can act to accelerate internationalization, 
as firms seek to overcome the disadvantages of a domestic footprint (Child and Rodriguez, 
2005) or institutional constraints (Witt and Lewin, 2007).  
This paper discusses the opportunities and limitations that the L assets of the home country 
represent for MNEs, particularly at the early stages of internationalization. The systemic 
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weaknesses of the home country can constrain the long-term competitiveness of its firms, and 
ultimately, the competitiveness of its MNEs. It is the contention of this paper that many of the 
emerging countries have a constrained set of location-specific assets from which their firms 
are able to develop O assets. This ultimately means that there are a few ‘pockets of 
excellence’ from which a large percentage of the EMNEs in each country have arisen from. 
But can these countries sustain this growth, as the comparative advantages and market 
opportunities available to the earlier generation gradually dissipate? Are their economies 
developing new and improved L assets that will promote a new generation of EMNEs? We 
examine data for the case of India, which is often touted as the economy with the greatest 
potential to enter more knowledge-intensive sectors. At the macro level, India’s performance 
is not different from countries of similar economic structure and development, and its pockets 
of excellence are a reflection of its L assets. Our analysis suggests that – if India is indeed a 
good exemplar - the failure of most emerging economies to foster and upgrade their L assets 
is likely to stunt the growth of their domestic firms, and ultimately any new MNE activity in 
the long-term.  
 
The EMNE debate and the home country 
The emergence of EMNEs and their growing global footprint has generated much debate in 
academia, resulting in various theoretical views on the topic. The traditional school of 
thought builds on the ownership-location-internalization (OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1979, 
1980, 1988) and asserts that the OLI framework can explain internationalization by EMNEs 
(Dunning et al, 1998; Dunning, 2006; Narula, 2012).  This perspective argues that EMNEs – 
like all MNEs - have O assets, and internationalize in much the same way as ‘conventional’ 
developed country MNEs, with any differences reflecting their early stage of 
internationalization and the different initial conditions, largely associated with their home 
economy. Their capabilities are a function of their own investments in formal and informal 
R&D, both at home and abroad, as well as their engagement with the knowledge 
infrastructure in these various locations.  
Other researchers have argued that EMNEs are a new phenomenon which require new 
theories (e.g. Mathews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007; Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009). Most 
importantly, they discount the importance of O assets, proposing instead that OFDI can be a 
means to acquire assets. Mathews (2006) proposed the linkage, leverage and learning (LLL) 
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model to explain internationalization of EMNEs. The model explains that EMNEs are 
globally oriented, forming links with incumbent firms and upgrading capabilities through 
learning. Luo and Tung (2007) advocated the springboard perspective in which EMNEs use 
internationalization as a springboard to avoid market and institutional weaknesses in their 
home country, to obtain strategic assets, and to overcome their competitive disadvantages. 
Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) assert that EMNEs follow an accelerated 
internationalization behavior, and their limited international presence enabled them to adopt 
an organizational structure and strategy that is appropriate for the current global business 
environment. Although these researchers argue that EMNEs can obtain O assets by acquiring 
firms in advanced countries (e.g. Mathews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007; Madhok and 
Keyhani, 2012), there is simply no evidence that the requisite recombinative capabilities to 
integrate acquisitions into their existing operations are widely available (Hennart, 2012). 
Moreover, firms embed themselves in host countries only gradually as suggested by the 
Uppsala model of internationalization.  
Ramamurti and his various associates have proposed a ‘middle road’, arguing that the study 
of EMNEs simply requires an extension of existing theories. Ramamurti (2009) argues that 
while EMNEs possess some level of O assets, these are different from the ones possessed by 
conventional MNEs. They also follow particular paths of internationalization which are 
influenced by the home country of the firms and the context of their international expansion. 
This perspective holds that conventional MNEs have had a higher reliance on country-
specific assets. EMNEs, on the other hand, seek to overcome home country bottlenecks, 
overcoming limitations in ‘traditional’ O assets through asset-augmentation by 
internationalization (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012). 
All these views take a minimalist approach to the home country, implying that EMNEs are 
unlike ‘conventional’ MNEs, for whom internationalisation depending significantly on the 
home country. Following Narula (2012), we argue that this is not the case: the home country 
plays a significant role in constraining and defining the kind of assets an MNE possesses, and 
provide the initial conditions for its international expansion, regardless of the nationality of 
the MNE. These ‘initial conditions’ are the L assets of a country. There are inevitable 
differences in the L assets between home countries, because countries have different resource 
endowments, innovation systems and political economies, and as such there are differences in 
the economic structure of different home countries, and by extension, the sectors in which 
they develop competitive firms. 
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Economic development of any given nation and the growth of its firm sector co-evolve, 
meaning that lesser developed economies tend to have a smaller and less competitive firm 
sector. By extension, such an economy will have fewer firms that possess O assets which will 
permit them to engage in viable outward direct investment, and many of the competitive 
advantages of domestic firms will be location-bound. Countries demonstrate a broadly similar 
economic structure (and set of L assets) at different levels of economic development, and also 
a similar degree of competitiveness of their domestic economic actors (and therefore its 
MNEs), given exogenous limitations due to their resource constraints or abundance 
(Dunning, 1981; Narula, 1996; Narula and Dunning, 2000, 2010). 
Countries evolve as they grow, with a consequent upgrading of L assets. Broadly speaking, 
there is a movement away from labour- and natural resource-intensive activity towards 
capital-intensive activity, and later to more knowledge-intensive activity (Dunning and 
Narula, 1996). A country’s comparative advantages and the competitive advantages of its 
firms show a high degree of interdependence. Strong initial comparative advantages biases a 
country’s economic structure towards industries, and thereby firms that utilise this initial 
advantage in future periods. Firms tend to embark on a path of knowledge accumulation 
within the envelope of these L assets, and shape a distinct profile of national technological 
specialization (Cantwell 1989). The O assets of nascent MNEs – which are the progeny of the 
more competitive domestic firms from these environments – therefore continue to reflect the 
home country innovation systems, and industrial structure and specialization (Narula, 1996, 
2003). The O assets of firms in any given period tend to be a function of the home country’s 
L assets, but only when these L assets are internalised (Narula, 2012). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The point we are making in this paper is that on the one hand, the initial O assets of MNEs 
are based on home country-specific advantages. These in turn reflects the home country’s 
comparative advantages such as the availability of natural resources or low-cost labour 
(Rugman, 2009), or through government support in the form of subsidies or privileged access 
to finance (e.g. Buckley et al, 2007). On the other hand, they internationalize to escape the 
weaknesses of their home country such as ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) by 
moving to countries with better institutions (e.g. Witt and Lewin, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008), or seek knowledge assets associated with location-bound assets of other 
countries. The balance between O assets that derive from the home and host country shifts 
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with increasing internationalization. MNEs with greater international experience can become 
multiply embedded within both the host and the home country innovation systems and socio-
economic milieu (Meyer et al, 2011), but the influence of the home country continues to 
persist and remains non-negligible even for conventional, highly globalised MNEs. As the 
work pioneered by Rugman and Verbeke (2004) has shown, many MNEs continue to show a 
strong bias towards their home regions. 
Innovation systems and innovative firms: the underlying logic of location assets  
Countries evolve over time: comparative advantages shift, and the kinds of L assets available 
to firms also evolves. Sustaining competitiveness requires upgrading O assets which in turn is 
dependent on innovation, and this requires research and development (R&D) and a 
supportive external environment of the firm. Firms have to continuously innovate and 
upgrade their capabilities to avoid falling behind competitors, and countries have to 
continuously invest in upgrading their technological infrastructure. Investment in R&D 
provides new knowledge for the firm as well as the absorptive capacity required to acquire, 
assimilate, adapt, and apply new and external knowledge. Absorptive capacity is developed 
as a by-product of the firm’s own R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), as well as its 
supportive external environment (Caloghirou et al, 2004), which are the L assets. 
The competitiveness of firms derives from their ability to leverage, develop and upgrade their 
knowledge assets, which presumes a certain extent of formal and informal innovation 
activities.  While innovation is utilised and internalised at the firm level, firms exist as part of 
‘systems’. Firms are embedded through historical, social and economic ties to other actors in 
their home country (Narula, 2003, 2014). The external environment involves broader factors 
that shape the behaviour of firms: the social and cultural context; the institutional and 
organisational framework; physical infrastructure; and innovation systems which create and 
distribute scientific knowledge (Verbeke, 2009).   
The generally accepted view in the IB and economic geography literature is that the 
technological competences of firms tend to be associated with specific locations, and that 
these are geographically constrained. Innovative activities are associated with specific 
location-bound assets, which are often associated with the knowledge infrastructure of that 
location, and, tend to be spatially concentrated (Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Iammarino and 
McCann, 2006).  Knowledge spillovers tend to be more intense between parties that are 
located close to each other in space (e.g., Maurseth and Verspagen, 2002). A systems view 
[8] 
 
builds around the important principle that knowledge diffusion between actors in 
geographical proximity foster innovation.  Proximity, of course, matters differently for 
different aspects of value-adding activity (Alcacer, 2006).  Likewise, L assets (and the 
importance of collocation) matters differently for different industries, and depending upon a 
variety of factors, the need for proximity causes agglomerations or clusters.  Note that not all 
clusters require the same degree of geographical concentration, meaning that they may exist 
over a relatively large geographical area. The concept of clusters in innovation has been 
fleshed out by Iammarino and McCann (2006), who classify three types of clusters depending 
on the nature of innovation processes and structural conditions under which technical change 
occurs across space. First there are clusters that pure agglomerations, based on diversity 
externalities where knowledge is explicit and codified. The second type is industrial 
complexes, where cumulative learning derives from other cluster firms of the same or related 
industry, and relies on non-transferable knowledge. Third, there are social networks, where 
technological opportunities may derive from firms and industries that are not necessarily 
collocated.  
Emerging economies tend to have a comparative advantage in sectors that rely on low cost 
inputs (including labour) and economies of scale. They also tend to be in sub-sectors that 
sectors are some distance away from the frontier, which are themselves often oligopolistic in 
nature. In oligopolistic industries (as opposed to industries with a competitive market 
structure), loss to rivals is perceived as costly, and the private good aspect of knowledge is 
more important than the public good aspect (Iammarino and McCann, 2006). Thus clustering 
is balanced by the need to have access to scarce knowledge infrastructure and the need to 
limit unintended knowledge outflows (Narula and Santangelo, 2012).  
Emerging economy firms engaged in R&D– not unlike firms of other nationalities - often 
locate themselves to take advantage of a specific scientific specialization of a university or 
public research establishment, or to exploit spillovers from other firms in the same industry. 
The number of specialized institutions in a given scientific field are finite (and especially so 
in developing countries), so even where a technological leader would prefer to avoid spatial 
proximity with its less-able rivals, it cannot prevent these firms from collocating in order to 
establish embedded relationships with these institutions. Thus, the decision to embed locally 
in order to access local complementary knowledge depends on entry motivations and firms 
capabilities since such a decision may bring about risks of unintended knowledge spillovers 
(Perri et al, 2011; Santangelo, 2012).  Joining such clusters is also about access to ‘private 
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clubs’ and the informal institutions associated with these. This ties into the idea propagated 
by Marshall (1920) about successful agglomerations - something that is ‘in the air’, a stock of 
knowledge that is only available to members with a particular location-specific absorptive 
capacity by virtue of their constant interaction. 
By virtue of the limited knowledge infrastructure in most emerging economies, there tends to 
be a concentration of internationally competitive parent firms of EMNEs in just a few 
industries. In other words, the tendency to be engaged in oligopolistic sectors that are human-
capital intensive and rely on scale economies, combined with a few ‘pockets of excellence’ in 
the knowledge infrastructure (which are locationally bound), there is a tendency for clusters 
to exist around these sectors which themselves tend to be geographically concentrated.  
It is thus fairly reasonable to expect that only countries with strong L assets will foster 
internationally competitive domestic firms in the same (or related) sectors, and by examining 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of L assets we can identify areas of competence or 
potential competence (and internationally competitive MNEs). Conversely, weaknesses in the 
knowledge infrastructure can also indicate industrial sectors where domestic firms will be 
weak, and are likely to venture overseas to exploit the knowledge infrastructure of host 
locations.  
L assets can be divided into three broad categories (figure 1): 
1. There are L assets that can be described as basic infrastructure because they are in 
principle public goods, and are available to all firms at marginal cost. Examples 
include unskilled human capital, health care, utilities, telecoms, ports, public transport 
etc. The efficient provision of basic infrastructure has a positive influence on the cost 
structure and productivity of firms operating in a location. If infrastructure services 
are not publicly provided, firms seek to create their own private networks, leading to 
wastage of resources and duplication, thereby affecting their efficiency (Erenberg, 
1993). In this paper we classify unskilled human capital as a ‘basic’ L asset, 
distinguishing it from skilled human capital which falls into the next category.  
2. The second category of L assets is knowledge infrastructure which consists of public 
research institutes, universities, organisations for standards, intellectual property 
protection, etc. that enables and promotes science and technology development 
(Smith, 1997).  Knowledge infrastructure is synonymous with what can be usefully 
described as the ‘non-firm sector’, because it is not driven by a rent motive (Narula, 
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2002).  Such L assets play an important role in promoting the innovatory and 
absorptive capacity of firms. They also act as a mechanism to “direct” technology 
strategy and as a mechanism to implement industrial and innovation policy. Progress 
towards more knowledge-intensive manufacturing and service activities crucially 
depends on the existence of knowledge infrastructure. Knowledge infrastructure has 
the unusual characteristic that it is often not a purely public good, but a quasi-public 
good. They are available differentially to different players, either because of 
government policy, or because they are controlled by a group of incumbents. In short 
they are not freely available, and may not be used by others without (some) detriment 
to their value. This knowledge may be available to incumbents (whether domestic or 
foreign), by virtue of their existing activities on that location, and acquired through 
experience. 
Quasi-public goods imply exclusive access, but in the case of developing countries 
which are resource-constrained, when a certain set of assets is in limited supply, those 
with access to them may not wish to compete with others through markets for this 
access, thereby creating barriers to entry.  That is, L assets can move from the public 
to the private domain (i.e., they are internalised by specific economic actors), and they 
are no longer L assets but constitute O assets. 
In addition to L assets that derive from the non-firm sector, knowledge infrastructure 
also needs to include inward FDI. Foreign-owned affiliates engaged in knowledge 
intensive activities generate spillovers that are in principle also L assets because they 
are potentially available to all firms in the same location. Thus, collocation with 
foreign affiliates has potential knowledge externalities for domestic firms (Criscuolo 
and Narula, 2008; Narula and Santangelo, 2012). Foreign MNEs are likely to 
establish local operations in sectors where the L assets are strongest, and in so doing 
further reinforce the L assets available in a given location. Such  
3. The third category of L assets is institutions. The interactions between the various 
actors within an economy are governed by institutions.  They are the ‘glue’ that binds 
the various actors together, and determine the efficacy of their interaction (or lack 
thereof).  Institutions are taken here to be of two types, informal and formal, and are 
generally understood as ‘sets of common habits, routines, established practises, rules, 
or laws that regulate the interaction between individuals and groups’ (Edquist and 
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Johnson, 1997). In essence, institutions underlay the cumulative causation of all 
elements within a system in the sense proposed by Myrdal (1957).  Institutions are 
associated with public goods, but are not exclusively so, and therefore classified 
separately in this paper. 
Government policies are an essential component of institutions, and include the 
appropriate intellectual property rights regime, competition policy, the creation of 
technical standards, taxation, the establishment of incentives and subsidies for 
innovation, etc.  Government policies also foster informal institutions, for example, 
by encouraging firms and individuals to collaborate, or by promoting entrepreneurial 
spirit and good governance (Narula, 2014).  
In the following sections we examine the strengths and weaknesses of India’s L assets within 
these three categories. The technological activities undertaken by firms in a location reflect 
the level of technological advancement in that location, and the specialization of firms and 
their competitiveness is reflected in the specialization and areas of competitiveness of the 
home country. In other words, the specialization of a country’s firms can be identified by 
examining the specialization at the aggregate level.  
 
Can EMNE activity continue to grow? 
OFDI flows from developing countries has been increasing since the 1970s, but it has 
increased considerably faster since the 1990s as a result of pro-market reforms in many 
developing countries, and amounted to $426 billion in 2012, which represented a compound 
annual growth rate of 15% over 20 years. Global FDI growth has a corresponding rate of 
10% over the same period. The share of the developing countries in the global outward FDI 
stock has been increasing, and in 2012 stood at 19% (UNCTAD, 2013). This share includes 
the Asian NICs, which for all intents and purposes, are wrongly classified as developing 
countries. In the absence of the NICs, the developing country share stood at just 9% in 2012, 
a more modest increase. Indeed, when the tax haven economies of the Caribbean are also 
excluded, the share of the developing countries has shown no appreciable increase in terms of 
their share in the global total. When the BRICS countries’ FDI is examined in terms of their 
share of the total, this can be seen to have a much more modest growth, as shown in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
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A small number of developing countries from Asia and Latin America account for much of 
this OFDI stock. EMNEs have been using M&A as an important mode of entry into foreign 
markets and therefore cross-border M&A data provides additional evidence on the growth of 
OFDI from developing countries. The number of cross-border M&A deals by EMNEs 
increased from 108 in 1990 to more than 1000 in 2012, and majority of the deals by EMNEs 
were in other developing countries (UNCTAD, 2013).  
India as an exemplar: trends in EMNE activity from India 
Like other developing countries, OFDI flow from India has been witnessing a drastic drop in 
the last five years. Indian OFDI flows amounted to $8.5 billion in 2012 which is a significant 
decrease from the peak of $21 billion it reached in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2013). Moreover, 
India’s share in total global OFDI stock has remained almost constant in the last five years 
while China has almost doubled its share. In 2008, Indian OFDI stock accounted for 0.4% of 
global OFDI stock while China contributed 1.1%. By 2012, India increased its share slightly 
to 0.5% while China almost doubled its share in global OFDI stock to 2.1% (Figure 2). Major 
outward investor countries such as Brazil, Russia and Mexico also have a higher share of 
global OFDI stock than India. 
The acquisitions made by Indian MNEs were spread across various industries, but 
concentrated in a few pockets of excellence, with pharmaceutical, software, and machinery 
and equipment accounting for majority of M&A deals. During 2001-2012, these three 
industries accounted for almost 67% of the more than 1100 overseas acquisitions by Indian 
MNEs (Chittoor and Jana, 2013). An important feature of internationalisation by Indian 
MNEs is the prominence of business group-affiliated companies. Indeed, a majority of the 
top Indian MNEs belong to business groups such as Tata, Birla and Ambani, as shown in 
Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Evaluating India’s innovation activity 
Examining India’s aggregate expenditures on R&D gives a good indication of its 
competitiveness.  India’s R&D intensity was 0.7% in 2010 which was lower than countries 
like China (1.7%), Brazil (1.2%), Russia (1.2%), and much lower than developed countries 
(UNESCO, 2012). India’s R&D intensity has remained almost constant in the last two 
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decades, while other major developing countries have increased their spending significantly. 
For instance, China’s R&D intensity increased from 0.5% in 1996 to 1.0% in 2002, and 1.7% 
in 2010. India’s per capita R&D expenditure was also much lower than major developing and 
developed countries. In 2007, India’s per capita R&D expenditure was $20.7 while that of 
China and Brazil were more than 5 times, and Russia’s 11 times more than India (UNESCO, 
2012). 
The R&D intensity of Indian-based firms and the benchmark international R&D intensity in 
various sectors are given in Table 2. The four highest R&D intensities for India were in 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food products, and motor vehicles. With the exception of food 
products, no Indian sector comes close to the global R&D intensity. Pharmaceutical sector 
may have had the highest R&D intensity among Indian companies, but this was still half of 
its counterparts in the rest of the world (Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
R&D intensity of the largest Indian R&D spenders in 2011 is given in Table 3, but even here, 
the highest R&D intensity was 7.3% (in the pharmaceutical sector). Infosys was the highest 
R&D spender in absolute terms in India in 2011 (but with a R&D intensity of just 5.3%). 
Indian companies in the oil and gas, and iron and steel industries also had high R&D 
expenditures but had lower R&D intensities than their international counterparts located 
elsewhere. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Another indicator of the technological capabilities of a location is the patents its firms 
receive. At the aggregate level, during 2008-2012 the US Patents and Trademarks Office 
granted 5336 patents to Indian assignees (USPTO, 2013). In terms of sectors, information 
technology (IT), software, electronics, pharmaceutical and engineering held more than 85% 
of patents. Table 4 gives details of patents granted to firms based in India between 2008 and 
2012, and suggests that 3450 US patents granted were to 91 subsidiaries of foreign MNEs. 
That is, 77% of all patents granted were to foreign firms. Just 45 Indian firms accounted for 
688 patents over the same period, and 90% of patents to private firms were in two sectors: 
pharmaceuticals and IT/software. The non-firm sector in India accounted for the remaining 
334 patents. The patent data for Indian companies indicate that they had not fully leveraged 
India’s location advantages for R&D while foreign multinationals had. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
The data suggests that a small group of firms (domestic and foreign) control a 
disproportionately large share of R&D activity. Estimates are that close to 60% of 
expenditures in R&D were made by large Indian business groups, 15% by SOEs, and 10% by 
MNEs (NISTADS, 2008). The following industrial sectors accounted for the majority of 
R&D expenditures (in order of significance): pharmaceuticals, transportation equipment, 
defence, electrical and electronic equipment, chemicals, fuels, and IT and software 
(NISTADS, 2008). These are the same sectors (with the exception of defence) in which 
India’s OFDI is concentrated. Indeed, of the more than 1100 M&As by Indian firms during 
2001-2012, the majority were by software and business service companies, and 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies. In other words, the sectors with higher levels of 
R&D and patenting are also the sectors which have internationalized the most.  
The data reviewed in this section make clear that only a few industries in India are 
internationally competitive, with the commensurate innovation capabilities to sustain this. 
These industries have higher R&D intensity and patenting levels than others, leading to the 
creation of ‘pockets of excellence’. Most of the rapidly internationalizing Indian MNEs of the 
last two decades are concentrated in these sectors. 
 
Examining India’s location-specific assets 
Basic infrastructure bottlenecks  
Good infrastructure leads to increase in productivity and decrease in production costs, but it 
needs to expand fast enough to respond to economic growth, which is especially significant 
for developing economies. In India, physical infrastructure has failed to expand in response to 
the rapid economic growth of the last two decades. For instance, during the Eleventh Five-
Year Plan period (2007-2012), in spite of the creation of new generation capacity there was 
still an energy shortage of 8.7% as of 2012 (Ministry of Finance, 2013). More than 40% of 
firms had invested in private generators due to frequent power blackouts and brownouts 
(World Bank, 2006). In addition to the widening gap between energy demand and supply, 
electric power transmission and distribution losses are considerable. As shown in Table 5, the 
value lost through electrical outages remains very high in India compared to other major 
developing countries. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
Along with energy, transportation forms an important component of physical infrastructure. 
Transport infrastructure is considered to have great impact on the ‘supply chain capability’ of 
a country, given that firms are intricately linked to a variety of customers and suppliers, and 
the efficiency with which intermediates and other inputs for the focal organization can be 
delivered (Alam and Bagchi, 2011). It has a pronounced effect on the efficiency and 
competitiveness of firms operating in that location.  
Although India has one of the largest rail networks in the world, it has consistently 
underinvested in upgrading its network. Between 1950 and 2010, the size of the network 
grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3%, while freight and passenger traffic 
grew at a CAGR of 54%, leading to oversaturation of the rail network (Deloitte, 2012). 
Although India had a larger network than China in 1990, China made significant investments
3
 
in its railway infrastructure over the last two decades, and by 2011 the total route length in 
China exceeded India’s (Table 5). In addition to the lack of investment in infrastructure, 
transit times for freight in India are long and uncertain. For instance, a freight train takes as 
much as 6-8 days to travel a distance of 2000 kilometres (Deloitte, 2012).  
61% of cargo is moved by road in India compared to 37% in the US and 22% in China. 
However, the percentage of paved roads in India is lower than countries like China, Russia, 
Indonesia, and the developed world (Table 5). In addition to the inadequate road network and 
poor quality of roads, transit times are also long. For instance, according to a study by 
Transport Corporation of India, a 2150 kilometre journey between Kolkata and Mumbai 
trucks typically have to stop for as much as 32 hours at various checkpoints at 26 different 
locations, taking up to 8 days to cover the distance (Economist, 2006). In addition to railways 
and roads, other modes of transport also suffer from several issues. For example, the average 
turnaround time for ships in an Indian port is more than double the turnaround time in ports 
in Colombo, Singapore, Hong Kong and Rotterdam (Deloitte, 2012).  
Telecommunication also forms an integral part of the physical infrastructure in a country. 
Growth effects are considered to be significantly higher in countries where 
telecommunication infrastructure has reached universal service (Roller and Waverman, 
2001). For instance, a 10% increase in broadband penetration increases per capita income 
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 China spent $8.8 billion on railway infrastructure construction in the first quarter of 2013 (Wall Street Journal, 
2013). 
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growth by 0.9-1.5% (Czernich et al, 2011). Although India is one of the fastest growing 
telecom markets in the world, it lags behind other developing countries in terms of broadband 
penetration. Just 1% of India’s population has broadband access compared to 11.6% in China, 
8.5% in Brazil, and 13.1% in Russia. Overall internet penetration in India is 11.4% of total 
population which is one of the lowest among developing countries. 
  
Knowledge infrastructure bottlenecks  
Knowledge spillovers generated by innovative and technological activities often stay within 
the location in which knowledge was originally created, leading to regions of specialization.  
In the absence of a strong knowledge infrastructure, spillovers may be lost. The main 
function of the knowledge infrastructure is production and diffusion of knowledge, protection 
of knowledge through regulation and standards, and creating skilled workforce through 
education and training (Smith, 1997). 
The single most important constituent of knowledge infrastructure in any location is skilled 
human capital. One channel through which human capital affects economic growth is by 
facilitating the adoption of new technology (e.g. Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Acemoglu, 2003; 
Caselli and Coleman, 2006).  Human capital is an important source of competitive advantage 
for firms because knowledge is acquired and used by the people in an organization, both 
collectively and individually. 
As Table 6 shows, the number of researchers in R&D per million people in 2009 was 863.2 
in China, 703.7 in Brazil, 3092.3 in Russia, 1091.2 in Argentina, while there were only 135.8 
researchers per million people in India. The gap between India and developed countries is 
much wider. Similarly, only 13.1% of total researchers in India have advanced research 
qualifications such as PhD’s (Table 6). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
India’s output of doctorates in science and engineering (S&E) is possibly insufficient to meet 
both current and future demand. Most IITs, India’s top-tier technical universities have on 
average almost half their academic positions vacant
4
. Herstatt et al (2008) suggest that the 
shortfall in qualified PhD-level teaching positions in India was in the range of 40,000. It is 
worth noting that between 2006 and 2009, there were 8266 Indian recipients of US 
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doctorates, of whom 88% indicated they had plans to stay on in the US. This suggests a rather 
large (and possibly permanent) brain drain (NSF, 2012). Contrast this with the fact that 
Indian universities produced fewer than 8000 S&E doctorates in 2006, the most recent year 
for which data is available (NSF, 2012). This is significantly lower than China, which 
produces three times as many S&E PhDs. 
This lack of academic staff amongst universities has implications for the expansion of 
university education to meet growing demand for S&E graduates. Although India produces 
more than half a million S&E graduates every year, a study suggests that in 2011 only 17.5% 
of the engineers were employable in the IT support services sector, while a mere 2.7% of 
engineers are employable by information technology product companies which require high 
levels of knowledge of algorithms and computer science (Aspiring Minds, 2011). Of the 355 
universities in India in 2008, only 140 were accredited, of which only a third were rated by 
the Indian government as ‘A’ grade (National Knowledge Commission, 2009). Although the 
Indian government has turned to the private sector to create new capacity in the tertiary 
education sector, this has yet to make any significant contribution
5
 (Ministry of Human 
Resource Development, 2009).  India has one of the lowest expenditures on higher education 
per student in Asia, in addition to having one of the lowest gross enrolment ratios in the 
developing world (National Knowledge Commission, 2009).  
Shortage of skilled workers puts an upwards pressure on the costs of employing the most 
competent graduates, and this is perhaps the single largest bottleneck underlying Indian 
industry over the next few decades. Under-qualified workers require expensive in-house 
training programmes, which is an additional cost to employers. Indeed, several large 
companies maintain quite considerable in-house training capacity for this reason (Modwel 
and Jelassi, 2010). A related issue is the scarcity of skilled and experienced managers, which 
ultimately tends to be sourced from the same pool of employees within firms. For instance, 
McKinsey (2001) found that by 2010 there would be a shortfall of 200,000 managers in the 
IT sector alone.   
Interactive learning within an economy depends in large part on collaboration between firms, 
universities and public research organisations. The non- firm sector plays a dual role as 
providers of R&D and as providers of human capital (Pavitt, 1984), which is essential for 
firms to build absorptive capacity. There is limited interaction between academic and 
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 The Yashpal Committee Report indicates that 108 private universities had been set up by 2008. However, in 
the absence of clear guidelines, accreditation systems and monitoring, the quality remains quite ambiguous.  
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research institutions and firms in India (D’Costa, 2009), which points to the nascent nature of 
the innovation system. 
While India has a large non-firm sector with about 2000 public research institutes (Ministry 
of Science and Technology, 2010), most of these are run along administrative lines and suffer 
from inefficiencies (NISTADS, 2008). An exception to this is the Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) which has a stock of 4600 highly specialized scientists and 8,000 
scientific and technical support personnel. It supports 7,000 research scholars for doctoral 
research in S&T throughout the country and awards over 1000 doctorates annually. It is also 
the single largest Indian patent assignee in India
6
. 65% of their budget is spent on 
pharmaceuticals, biotech, electronics/electrical equipment, and chemicals/petrochemicals 
research. 
Many of these public research organisations suffer from a fundamental mismatch between 
their mandate and demand. Although the Indian economy was liberalized in 1991, public 
research organisations continue to prioritise self-reliance, as expected from an import-
substituting model of industrialisation. India’s non-firm sector was not intended to promote 
domestic enterprises to achieve competitiveness at an international level, as would be 
expected for an export-oriented policy of economic development (NISTADS, 2008). As such, 
these organisations suffer from systemic inertia, and are acutely unsuited to support industry 
for the challenges of the global economy (Narula, 2003).  
Despite this immense public infrastructure, India has a low share of public sector R&D, and it 
has fallen in real terms with economic growth, with the private share of total R&D increasing 
from about 50% to 65% between 2003 and 2005 (NISTADS, 2008). Six industrial sectors 
(pharmaceutical, automotive, electrical, electronics, chemicals and defence) account for about 
two-thirds of the total industrial R&D.  The higher education sector contributes about 5% of 
total R&D expenditures, but remains highly concentrated in a few institutions. Moreover, 
firms are extremely dependent on their internal resources for financing of R&D, with limited 
resources and support from the public research sector. This is unlike the case in the US and 
Europe where the innovation system mitigates the uncertainty within innovation, both 
financial and technological (Arora, 2011). 
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Institutional bottlenecks 
The dominant view in research on institutions and development is that institutions determine 
economic performance (e.g. Acemoglu et al, 2005), and quality of institutions have been 
highlighted as the reason behind differences in competitiveness between countries (Glaeser et 
al, 2004, Rodrik et al, 2004). Institutional quality has also been found to influence FDI flows: 
poor institutions at home drive away firms in search of locations with better institutional 
development (e.g. Witt and Lewin, 2007).  
Although India has achieved rapid strides in economic development since liberalization in the 
early 1990s, institutional development has not kept pace. For example, the settlement of 
industrial disputes in the organised sector is still governed by the Industrial Disputes Act 
1947. Firms employing more than 100 workers still need to obtain government permission 
before firing employees or closing down.  
The quality of administrative practices such as costs of starting a business, obtaining 
permissions and licences, and hiring employees are important inputs for new enterprise 
creation and improving productivity (e.g. World Bank, 2010; Branstetter et al, 2013). 
Procedural delay due to red tape is another constraint faced by firms and multinationals in 
India. As shown in Table 7, the time taken to enforce a contract in India is double the time 
taken in Brazil, three times that of China, and five times that of Russia. Senior management 
of a typical firm in India spends 6.7% of management time in a week to deal with 
government regulation related to taxes, customs, licensing and labour regulation compared to 
0.9% in China, 1.6% in Indonesia and 0.4% in Thailand. It takes almost 30 days to obtain an 
electrical connection in India whereas it takes only about 7 days in China and 4 days in South 
Korea. The time taken to clear exports through customs in India is 15 days while it is much 
lower in other developing Asian economies (Table 7).  A delay in shipping a product by an 
additional day reduces the volume of trade by more than 1% (Djankov et al, 2010). 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Another aspect of institutional quality that affects development and competitiveness is 
corruption (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). Corruption is also linked to the procedural delays 
faced by businesses in many countries. According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(WBES), 47.5% of firms in India are expected to make informal payments to ‘get things 
done’ (Table 7). 25.6% of firms in the WBES considered corruption as a major constraint in 
India while this is only 0.6% of firms in China.  
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India has strong democratic political institutions which encourage legislation through debates 
and discussions. However, this has also created deadlocks due to disruption of the parliament 
by opposition parties, and also because of the pressure on the leading ruling party to satisfy 
the ideological whims of its coalition partners to ensure coalition stability (e.g. Spary and 
Garimella, 2013). This has often resulted in a logjam of bills to be passed by the parliament, 
many of them pertaining to important policy decisions.  
Informal institutions also play a role in business. Research has shown that national pride 
influence attitudes towards global economic issues (e.g. Muller-Peters, 1998) as well as 
investment decisions (e.g. Hope et al, 2011). Developing countries have been found to bid 
higher on average to acquire assets in developed countries. For example, Tata Steel acquired 
Corus in 2007 for $12 billion, a price that was inflated mainly due to the bidding war with 
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional of Brazil. Corus has faced losses since 2009, made 2500 
job cuts in the UK, and is trying to dispose assets and refinance debts (Financial Times, 
2013).  
 
Sector-specific L assets and the prospects for FDI growth 
The previous sections have examined India’s L assets on a comparative basis, relative to 
those of other countries. In this section, we make some sector-specific observations. 
India’s services sector 
The growth of India’s service sector is an important curiosity for several reasons (Table 1). 
First, quite unlike other developing countries, the gradual shrinking of the relative importance 
of the agricultural sector over the last 40 years has not been associated with a commensurate 
growth in the manufacturing sector, which has shown only marginal changes in its share of 
the economy, with the slack being taken up by the growth of the service economy (Kumar 
and Gupta, 2008). To some extent service sector growth has happened despite government 
policy. 
Second, although it requires knowledge infrastructure, this sector has grown through firms 
substituting public goods with private goods. Service firms by definition are even more 
dependent upon recruiting skilled workers (which make up the majority of their 
employment), and for whom output is crucially associated with the quality of these 
employees. ILO (2013) notes that salaried workers in services reported a 150% increase in 
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wages between 2006 and 2010, three times the increase in the consumer price index.  The 
bottlenecks in the education sector discussed earlier, coupled with the high rates of attrition 
means that Indian firms are pushed to move abroad, as wage costs go up but labour 
productivity does not demonstrate a commensurate increase. The services sector has 
benefitted from a large inflow on FDI by highly competitive MNEs, causing domestic firms 
to ‘raise their game’ through greater innovativeness. At the same time, this has also caused an 
upwards pressure on wages.  
Data show that over the period 1980-2004, over 60% of the total factor productivity growth 
in India came from the services sector. (Das et al, 2010) The services sector in India will 
struggle to grow at quite the same pace it enjoyed during the last two decades because of 
fundamental shortage of skilled (and affordable) manpower, both technical and managerial. 
The services sector will see greater internationalisation, because there will be a ‘push’ effect 
to overcome shortage of critical inputs, in addition to its natural propensity - by virtue of its 
demand driven nature - for proximity to the customer. Indeed, services and software are 
already the largest areas of outward FDI. 
The state-owned enterprise sector  
The SOE sector – while not as large as China – is still relatively large at approximately 15% 
of GDP (Dougherty et al, 2009), and a similar share of employment. State-ownership is 
considerable in sectors as diverse as telecommunications, energy, banking and dairy 
processing, and in most instances remains highly inefficient. McKinsey (2001) estimated that 
continued state ownership supressed GDP growth by approximately 0.7% annually and there 
is little evidence that this has been addressed in the decade since this study. A number of the 
largest Indian MNEs are SOEs. ONGC Videsh, an SOE in the petroleum sector, has the 
highest transnationality index of all Indian firms (Table 1). 
Dougherty et al (2009) estimated that India’s share of highly concentrated industries was 
three times as large as that of China or the US. This suggests that there is a much greater 
potential for anti-competitive behaviour by firms, and less of an incentive to upgrade their O 
assets. It also means that such firms are able to generate monopoly rents and are less likely to 
venture abroad, and where they do so, will not be concerned with the commercial viability of 
these activities.  
Indian SOEs in India are known to be poorly managed at home, and suffer from low 
productivity. These firms enjoy a near monopoly (or at least have a market-making position) 
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in some sectors guaranteeing their profits however unproductive they may be. Poorly-
performing SOEs in industries open to competition such as steel and retail banking can get 
government support, allowing them, too, to survive despite their inefficiencies (McKinsey, 
2001). In some sectors, the government controls both the large players and the regulators, 
creating an uneven playing field for private competitors. Any expansion of this sector abroad 
– primary amongst them are resource intensive SOEs – will in any case not be based on a 
financial or performance motive.  
Growth in the manufacturing sector 
FDI from India’s manufacturing sector is very low, and this reflects the overall weakness of 
India’s manufacturing industry. From textiles and apparel to pharmaceuticals, there is 
considerable evidence that while there are opportunities for export growth, Indian firms 
remain concentrated in the upstream and low(er) value adding parts of the value chain. The 
low levels of OFDI compared to the high export propensity of these two sectors indicate that 
their O assets are location-bound. In pharmaceuticals, despite improvements in India’s IPR 
laws, protection for patents remains weak, acting to limit inward FDI as well as discouraging 
domestic firms from expanding into new drug discovery (as evidenced by the low R&D 
intensity of Indian companies).   
In sectors such as automotive components and textiles, domestic growth is limited by the 
problems of small scale production by the multitude of micro-enterprises that dominate in 
India, in sectors where there are large minimum efficient scales, and there are considerable 
economies of scale.   
The automobile sector has gone shopping for acquisitions to overcome their limited O assets 
portfolio, and the growing competition from inward FDI. They have responded by engaging 
in significant acquisitions abroad (Kumaraswamy et al, 2012), but the strength of Indian 
firms remains as suppliers within low-value automobile components.  While Indian 
automobile manufacturers have also sought to expand through international acquisitions, the 
evidence points to a failure to integrate their acquisitions with their Indian operations. That is, 
they maintain their foreign acquisitions as autonomous subsidiaries. From their failure to 
upgrade the products from their domestic operations with superior technology from these 
acquired firms, it seems clear that they do not have the organisational and managerial skill to 
engage in systematic reverse technology transfer. There are few reasons to believe that Indian 
firms can substitute for weaknesses in the L assets at home by going abroad, or avoiding 
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investing in R&D themselves by buying up firms with an existing portfolio of technological 
assets.  Both require recombination advantages and an especially high absorptive capacity.  
Certainly, there are opportunities in inter-industry integration. For instance, the growth of 
inward FDI in the IT/software sector is partly driven by hardware companies that seek 
complementarities in software from India. There is great potential in the hardware side of IT, 
if the innovation system were upgraded to promote an integrated approach that boosts the 
hardware and software sectors simultaneously.  
There are other areas for possible cross-fertilization, where India’s existing pockets of 
excellence can ‘cross-over’, such as, for instance, bio-informatics, and the growth of 
biotechnology (an area where the government has invested considerably (NISTADS, 2008)). 
However, each presents its own challenges, and broadly speaking, the same bottlenecks in 
terms of basic and knowledge infrastructure, as well as institutions will constrain each of 
these ‘new’ sectors. 
It is a particular feature of the Indian economy that a very large share of the economy remains 
in the informal sector, which accounted for 93% of total employment in 2008 (Ministry of 
Finance, 2010). Indian manufacturing sector is dominated by micro-enterprises of which the 
overwhelming majority are in the informal sector, and their total factor productivity is half 
that of larger enterprises (Dougherty et al, 2009). The dominance of informal sector is a result 
of India’s labour legislation and pre-reform regulations that provide on the one hand special 
incentives to micro-enterprises by limiting entry to larger firms in certain sectors, while on 
the other hand, limiting the ability of larger firms to lay off or replace workers, or declare 
bankruptcy. Firms therefore prefer to be capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive to 
avoid the complexities of becoming larger. Large firms also tend to fragment outsourced 
activities to a considerable number of small units (perhaps because the smaller firms 
predominate) creating further inefficiencies. From our perspective it means that there will be 
fewer firms with O assets that can be exploited abroad, at least within the manufacturing 
sector.  
There is no evidence to suggest that the domestic manufacturing sector is likely to grow, at 
least not in the knowledge-intensive sectors. Poor physical and knowledge infrastructure limit 
India’s competitiveness in such sectors, and this applies not only to knowledge-intensive 
sectors (where India does not have a comparative advantage).  Even more labour-intensive 
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sectors such as textiles and apparel are becoming less competitive due to rising costs caused 
by infrastructure bottlenecks.  
In particular, weakness of state support in education and training creates a cost for private 
firms, since they must privately provide what is normally a public good, making them less 
competitive. Larger firms are able to overcome some of these gaps in public goods by 
investing in their own infrastructure – building training centres and institutes, generating their 
own electricity, and so on, but smaller firms (and less successful ones) simply cannot absorb 
such costs. This makes Indian firms less competitive in international markets. Firms without 
the political clout to seek exceptions (typically the large business groups and SOEs that 
dominate the Indian economy) will seek to ‘exit’. From the point of view of OFDI, it means 
we are likely to see the more competitive firms seeking to escape institutional voids and 
India’s growing location disadvantages by relocating abroad. 
 
Conclusions and Managerial Implications  
Much of the literature on EMNEs has explained their rapid growth since the early 1990s by 
examining their overseas activity per se as proof of their competitiveness. This obfuscates a 
number of other important explanations, which have increased the spread and intensity of 
MNE activity and growing intra-firm trade by firms of all nationalities. The data on FDI 
indicates that the growth of EMNE activity has not greatly outpaced the overall growth of 
MNE activity; it has simply grown faster relative to itself.  That is, despite the high growth 
rate of OFDI from emerging economies, the share of OFDI has not altered dramatically
7
.  
The growth of FDI has to do with a number of factors associated with the global economy, 
not least of which has been an adoption of FDI-friendly regimes in a large number of 
developing and developed countries, the the WTO and agreements such as TRIPS and 
TRIMs, important breakthroughs in transport and logistics technology, global supply chains, 
among others. In addition, the rapid growth of service MNEs and the easing of restrictions on 
cross-border investments in banking, construction, insurance, information technology, and 
telecommunications have caused rapid FDI growth globally. 
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Nonetheless, the fact remains that there are competitive EMNEs which have succeeded in 
their own right, and some have prospered long enough for it to be obvious that they do 
possess O assets that allow them to be internationally competitive.  A significant number of 
these MNEs have enjoyed pseudo-monopolies at home, or have resources available to them 
by virtue of being national champions. They have been able to carefully build up a portfolio 
of non-location bound O assets through international M&A, and through judicious 
investments in R&D.  
This paper has asked: can we expect to see a new generation of EMNEs from these countries, 
as their home country comparative advantage has shifted away from low-cost labour and 
scale-based activities? Can the home countries sustain their need to build and upgrade 
capabilities to engage in global markets? We have built our arguments around the 
relationship between home-country L assets and the O assets of its firms. What are the 
prospects for a greater expansion of EMNEs, given their home country L assets?  
Using the case of India, one of the largest sources of OFDI from the developing world, we 
have sought to make a realistic evaluation of the growth prospects of EMNEs. Along to 
China and Brazil, India is considered to be one of the most knowledge-intensive emerging 
economies.   
The evidence would suggest that – like other emerging economies – Indian firms are unlikely 
to be able to rely on the knowledge infrastructure of their home economy, and are ‘exiting’ 
the Indian milieu because of its weaknesses in L assets, as much as to seek markets and 
customers elsewhere (Kumar, 2008). If this is true for India, which has more MNEs than 
many other emerging countries, the data suggests strongly that the situation is so much worse 
for most other emerging economies.  
Systemic and radical policy changes are needed to upgrade the knowledge infrastructure and 
institutions to support a shift in the competitive advantages to new sectors outside existing 
pockets of excellence. Opportunities in new and emerging sectors are more likely to benefit 
firms when governments have invested in creating a supportive institutional and knowledge 
infrastructure that encourages entrepreneurship and innovation, and where markets (for 
goods, capital, and assets) are most efficient. There will be more internationalization by 
EMNEs, but only when there is significant investment to upgrade L assets and when firms 
have the capacity to systematically upgrade their O assets there from. The absence of a viable 
knowledge infrastructure outside pockets of excellence acts as a tax on potential EMNEs, 
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because they must invest their own resources to upgrade, which in most developed countries 
is a public good.  
This is important not simply from a policy perspective, but also from a managerial one. In the 
absence of strong technological and managerial capabilities, there is clearly a danger that 
Indian MNEs will be unlikely to be able to effectively undertake reverse knowledge transfer 
(RKT) (Mudambi et al, 2014). Effective RKT implies efficient knowledge absorption and 
coordination between the various units, and where parent firms lag behind their foreign 
acquisitions, this fundamentally effects the parent-subsidiary power nexus (Mudambi et al, 
2013) 
Others (e.g., Contractor, 2013) have pointed to the entrepreneurial spirit that these firms have 
demonstrated in overcoming the disadvantages that accrue from emanating from home 
countries with poor L assets. However, in many instances, this early wave of EMNEs from 
the 1990s had been among the largest domestic firms in the home country, and have 
benefitted both from regulatory capture as well as access to cheap capital through intra-group 
transfers or discounted capital made available by governments (e.g., Gaur and Kumar, 2009; 
Buckley et al, 2007). Size matters in the internationalisation process. In the absence of 
appropriate L assets, there are few opportunities for new generations of firms to venture 
abroad from a position of strength, rather than as a means to overcome their home country 
disadvantages.   
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Figure 2: Global OFDI share of major developing countries (%) 
 
Source: UNCTADStat. 
 
Table 1: Top Indian MNEs, 2012  
Company Industry TNI% 
ONGC Videsh Petroleum 77.0 
Hindalco Industries Metal and mining 62.1 
Tata Steel Metal and mining 60.1 
Tata Global Beverages Food 60.0 
Motherson Sumi Systems Automotive 60.0 
HCL Technologies Software 57.0 
Tata Consultancy Services Software 56.3 
Tata Communications Telecommunication 56.0 
Suzlon Energy Energy 55.0 
Tata Motors Automotive 53.6 
Dr.Reddy's Laboratories Pharmaceutical 49.0 
Jubilant Life Sciences Pharmaceutical 47.0 
Infosys Software 44.0 
Punj Lloyd Infrastructure 43.0 
Bharti Airtel Telecommunication 42.8 
Tata Chemicals Chemicals 40.0 
Reliance Communications Telecommunication 18.8 
Source: UNCTAD Top 100 non-financial TNCs from developing countries 2013, Chittoor 
and Jana (2013). 
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Table 2: R&D intensities of various industries in India and worldwide. 
Industry R&D intensity, 2006-07 
India Global 
Pharmaceuticals 6.91 15.1 
Chemicals 2.49 3.1 
Food products 1.90 1.6 
Automobile 1.76 4.2 
Machinery 1.33 3.1 
Electronics 1.48 5.1 
Electrical 
machinery 
0.37 5.8 
Software 1.15 9.5 
Rubber & 
plastic 
0.59 2.1 
Textiles 0.25 2.7 
Basic metals 0.14 1.3 
Source: NISTADS (2008), Kumar and Gupta (2008) 
Table 3: Top Indian R&D spenders, 2011 
Company Industry R&D 
expenditure, 
2011(million 
Euros) 
R&D 
intensity 
(%) 
Infosys IT/software 258.8 5.3 
Tata Motors* Automotive 182.9 2.5 
Reliance Industries Oil & gas, chemicals 143.5 0.3 
Dr Reddy’s Laboratories Pharmaceuticals 84.4 6.2 
Tata Steel Iron & Steel 73.4 0.4 
Mahindra & Mahindra Automotive 70.8 0.9 
Lupin Pharmaceuticals 68.1 6.7 
Ashok Leyland Automotive 51.5 2.8 
ONGC Oil & gas 47.0 0.4 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Industrial engineering 46.6 0.8 
Cipla Pharmaceuticals 43.9 4.3 
Cadila Healthcare Pharmaceuticals 42.4 5.7 
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 42.3 7.3 
Sun Pharmaceutical Pharmaceuticals 41.5 7.3 
Wockhardt Pharmaceuticals 36.0 5.4 
*Tata Motors was not ranked in the EU Industrial R&D Scoreboard 2012. They spent INR 11.87 billion on 
R&D in 2010-2011 which was converted to Euro at the average Euro-INR exchange rate of 64.88 in 2011 
(Source: European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse) to obtain 182.9 million Euros. 
Source: European Union Industrial R&D Scoreboard 2012 and Tata Motors Annual Report 
2010-2011. 
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Table 4: Sectoral distribution of USPTO patent assignees in India (2008-2012) 
Industry Total Indian firms Foreign firms 
 Number 
of firms 
Patents Number 
of firms 
Patents Number 
of firms 
Patents 
IT/software 49 1909 10 188 39 1721 
Pharmaceutical 36 506 32 457 4 49 
Electronics 32 1003 1 12 31 991 
Telecommunication 6 48 0 0 6 48 
Engineering 4 497 1 5 3 492 
Chemicals 3 88 1 8 2 80 
Medical/healthcare 2 14 0 0 2 14 
Automotive 1 34 0 0 1 34 
Oil and gas 1 13 1 13 0 0 
Energy 1 5 0 0 1 5 
Textile 1 5 1 5 0 0 
Financial service 1 11 0 0 1 11 
Media service 1 5 0 0 1 5 
       
Non-firm 9 334 9 334 0 0 
       
Total 147 4472* 56 1022 91 3450 
* Includes all organisations that received five or more utility patents and excludes individual patent assignees. 
Total patents granted were 5336.  Note that industry classification of patents is based on industry of patenting 
firm, not industry of patent granted. 
Source: US Patents and Trademarks Office 
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Table 5: Basic infrastructure indicators for major countries 
Country Access to 
electricity 
(% of 
population) 
– 2009  
Electric 
power 
consumptio
n (kWh per 
capita) – 
2010  
Electric 
power 
transmission 
and 
distribution 
losses (% of 
output)  – 
2010 
Value lost 
to electrical 
outages (% 
of sales) – 
2002-2012*  
Rail line 
(total route 
kilometres) 
– 2011 
Paved roads 
(% of total 
roads) – 
2008-2011* 
Fixed 
broadband 
internet 
subscribers 
(per 100 
people) – 
2011  
Internet 
penetration 
(% of 
population) 
- 2012 
Developing countries 
China 99.4 2943.8 6.1         1.3 66239       84.1 11.6 40.1 
Brazil 98.3 2383.7 16.6            3.0 29817       12.9 8.5 45.6 
India 66.3 616.2 21.9          8.1  63974       49.5 1.0 11.4 
Russia - 6430.6 10.1          2.0 85292       79.0 13.1 47.7 
Mexico - 1990.4 16.3          3.4 26704       36.4 10.2 36.5 
Indonesia 64.5 641.3 9.3          2.2 -       56.9 1.1 22.1 
Argentina 97.2 2904.4 13.4          3.5 25023 - 10.5 66.4 
S. Africa 75.0 4802.5 9.5          1.6 22051 - 1.8 17.4 
Thailand 99.3 2243.4 6.3          1.5 4429 - 5.0 30.0 
Venezuela 99.0 3286.6 19.3          8.3 - - 6.1 41.0 
Developed countries 
Germany - 7215.4 3.8          0.0 33708 - 33.1 83.0 
Japan - 8394.1 4.4 - 20035 - 27.6 79.5 
UK - 5733.1 7.1 - 31471     100.0 32.7 83.6 
USA - 13393.9 5.9 - 228513     100.0 27.4 78.1 
*For each country, the latest available year of data is used. 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, CIA World Factbook, Internet World Stats 
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Table 6: Knowledge infrastructure indicators for major countries 
Country Researchers 
in R&D (per 
million 
people) – 
2005-2009* 
R&D 
expenditure 
per capita ($) 
–  
2006-2009*  
Researchers 
with ISCED 
grade 6
#
 
education (% 
of total 
researchers) – 
2003-2009* 
R&D 
expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
- 2010 
Scientific 
and 
technical 
journal 
articles – 
2009  
Secure 
internet 
servers (per 
million 
people) - 
2012 
High 
technology 
exports (% 
of 
manufactur
ed exports) - 
2011  
Inward 
FDI 
(million $) 
- 2012 
Per capita 
inward 
FDI ($) - 
2012 
Developing countries 
China 863.2 115.5 - 1.7 74019 3.1 25.8 832882.0 615.3 
Brazil 703.7 121.2 34.9 1.2 12306 55.5 9.7 702208.2 3540.1 
India 135.8 20.5 13.1 0.7 19917 3.5 6.8 226345.5 179.9 
Russia 3092.3 234.5 27.4 1.2 14016 38.6 7.9 508890.0 3566.1 
Mexico 383.5 54.5 28.9 0.3 4127 29.7 16.5 314968.0 2711.8 
Indonesia 89.6 3.3 14.0 0.1 262 4.0 8.3 205656.3 840.2 
Argentina 1091.2 86.6 24.8 0.5 3655 42.3 7.9 110704.3 2692.3 
S. Africa 393.0 95.9 47.9 0.9 2864 84.6 5.1 138964.0 2738.8 
Thailand 315.5 16.4 17.6 - 2033 19.1 20.7 159124.6 2276.7 
Venezuela 182.6  54.8 - 354 10.9 2.4 49079.0 1641.9 
Developed countries 
Germany 3849.6 1010.9 - 2.8 45003 1102.4 14.9 716344.0 8736.9 
Japan 5179.9 1086.5 17.4 3.4 49627 774.3 17.4 205361.1 1624.2 
UK 3794.1 641.3 - 1.8 45649 1534.1 21.3 1321352.0 20961.8 
USA 4673.2 1305.1 - 2.8 208601 1501.0 18.1 3931976.0 12301.1 
*For each country, the latest available year of data is used. 
#
International Standard Classification of Education 1997, grade 6 – Tertiary programmes leading to the award of an advanced research qualification such as Ph. D. 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Battelle/R&DMag 2012 Global R&D Funding Forecast 
[42] 
 
Table 7: Institutional indicators for major countries (2005-2012)* 
Country Number of 
days to 
enforce a 
contract 
Percentage 
of firms 
expected to 
make 
informal 
payments to 
‘get things 
done’ 
Management 
time spent on 
dealing with 
government 
regulation (% 
of mgmt time 
in a week) 
Days to 
obtain an 
electrical 
connection 
Days to 
clear 
exports 
through 
customs 
Developing countries 
China 406 10.7 0.9 6.9 7.6 
Brazil 731 11.9 18.7 36.8 15.9 
India 1420 47.5 6.7 29.5 15.1 
Russia 270 20.5 14.7 120.4 5.6 
Mexico 415 11.6 13.6 17.1 7.0 
Indonesia 498 14.9 1.6 15.5 2.3 
Argentina 590 18.1 20.8 54.2 7.3 
S. Africa 600 15.1 6.0 15.8 4.5 
Thailand 440 - 0.4 27.9 1.3 
Venezuela 510 23.6 27.6 13.9 18.4 
Developed countries 
Germany 394 - 1.2 3.2 4.7 
Japan 360 - - - - 
UK 399 - - - - 
USA 370 - - - - 
*For each country, the latest available year of data is used. 
Source: World Bank Doing Business, World Bank World Enterprise Survey 
